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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT L. BARKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and Respondents on
the Cross Appeal
Case No. 20870
v.
DR. HOWARD R. FRANCIS,
DEANNE TANNER FRANCIS,
DR. LARRY FRANCIS, and
ANN BANKS FRANCIS,
Defendants-Respondents
and Cross Appellants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the Court can remake the contract for the

parties and enforce a different agreement than that signed.
2.

Whether Plaintiff is entitled to specific

performance because of the inequitable conduct of Plaintiff and
his agent.
3.

Whether the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to

Purchase is enforceable since it is indefinite.
4.

Whether the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to

Purchase is enforceable since there was not a timely closing.
5.

Whether the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to

Purchase is enforceable since Plaintiff failed to tender
performance under the agreement.
6.

Whether Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought suit for the specific performance of
an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase wherein
Plaintiff agreed to exchange 80 acres of farm land with 180
shares of Scofield Reservoir water for a ranch owned by
Defendants in Nine Mile Canyon.

At a trial without a jury, the

court found that the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase was enforceable.

However, the court also found that

the earnest money agreement could not be specifically enforced
since the wives of the Defendants, who had an ownership
interest in the ranch, had not signed the earnest money
agreement and had not agreed to the property exchange.

The

court found that Defendants Howard and Larry Francis did breach
the earnest money agreement.

However, the court found that the

Plaintiff failed to introduce any competent evidence on
damages.

The court therefore awarded Plaintiff nominal damages

of $1.00 and attorneys fees in the amount of $22,126.80.
Plaintiff brought this appeal seeking reversal of the judgment
against Plaintiff on specific performance, and Defendants have
cross appealed from the judgment in favor of Plaintiff for
nominal damages and attorneys fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Robert Barker owns a farm near Wellington,
Utah.

(Tr. 152)

Roger Olson, a real estate broker, approached

Mr. Barker to obtain a listing on some property Mr. Barker
owned.

(Tr. 61)

At that time Mr. Barker informed Mr. Olson
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that he was looking to buy a ranch,

(Tr. 61.)

Mr. Olson

informed Mr. Barker that he was aware of a ranch for sale in
the area and that he would investigate it and get back to him.
(Tr. 61.)
Defendant Larry Francis is a doctor specializing in
obstetrics and gynecology.
Francis, is a dentist.

(Tr. 17)

(Tr. 359)

His brother, Larry

Larry and Howard Francis

along with their wives own a ranch in Nine Mile Canyon, located
in Carbon County and Duchesne County, Utah.
patient of Larry Francis.

(Tr. 362)

Mr. Olson was a

In about January of 1980,

Mr. Olson went to see Larry Francis and asked him if he was
willing to sell the Nine Mile Ranch.

(Tr. 363)

Larry Francis

told him that he would be if they could get $600,000 for it.
(Tr. 363)

Jerry S. Sprouse had an option to purchase the ranch

for $595,000.

(Tr. 27)

Larry Francis refused to give Mr.

Olson a listing agreement, but he gave him verbal permission to
show the ranch.

(Tr. 63)

Howard and Larry Francis were

interested in selling the ranch in order to get some cash
flow.

(Tr. 325)
Mr. Olson then showed Mr. Barker the ranch.

(Tr. 64)

Mr. Barker did not see the Larry and Howard at the time.
159)

(Tr.

After viewing the ranch, Mr. Olson and Mr. Barker

returned to Mr. Barker's home where they filled out the Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase which is the subject of
this suit.

(Tr. 159)
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Mr. Barker offered to purchase the "Howard Francis and
Larry Francis Ranch in Nine Mile Canyon."

The total purchase

price was $600,000 which was to be paid $1,000 cash; "the
balance of $599,000 shall be paid as follows:

Buyer agrees to

trade and seller agrees to accept in trade as payment for the
balance 173 shares of Scofield Resevoir (sic) water and 80
acres near Wellington, Utah belonging to the buyer."
A closing date of April 1, 1980 was proposed.

(Ex. 1)

(Ex. 1)

Mr. Olson then took the earnest money agreement to
Larry and Howard Francis.

Larry and Howard were told by Mr.

Olson that the 80 acres owned by Mr. Barker was an irrigated
functional farm.

(Tr. 325)

The Scofield water shares were

represented to be worth $2,800 per share.
371)

(Tr. 82, 186, 365,

Larry and Howard had not seen the Barker farm before

signing the earnest money agreement.

(Tr. 34)

All the representations regarding the farm to Larry
and Howard came from Mr. Olson who had received the information
from Mr. Barker.

(Tr. 30)

Based on the representations of Mr.

Olson, the Barker property exchange seemed to be an attractive
agreement to Larry and Howard.

(Tr. 30)

Larry and Howard still had questions and thought they
needed to investigate matters before signing the earnest money
agreement, and they needed to discuss the matter with their
wives.

(Tr. 324, 325)

Howard Francis told Mr. Olson that he

did not want to sign the agreement.

(Tr. 318)

Mr. Olson

replied that he would have to take somethimg back to Mr. Barker
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in writing so the parties would not get lost negotiating back
and forth.

(Tr. 318)

Both Larry and Howard agreed to sign the

agreement based on the understanding that the earnest money
receipt was a work sheet only and not a valid binding
agreement.

(Tr. 319, 328, 380)

Mr. Olson replied that he also

understood and realized that the earnest money was not
sufficient.

(Tr. 319)

Deanne Francis, the wife of Howard Francis, was also a
joint owner in the Nine Mile Ranch.
in the negotiations for the sale.

She had not been involved
(Tr. 295)

Mr. Olson came to

Mrs. Francis1 home and explained why he was there.

Deanne

Francis told him that she did not want to sign the agreement.
(Tr. 297)

Mr. Olson replied that it wasn't a binding

agreement, that it was just a preliminary paper.

(Tr. 297,

298)
Additionally, Anne Francis, the wife of Larry Francis,
who also has a joint interest in the Nine Mile Ranch, was not
involved in the negotiations for the property exchange.
350)

(Tr.

Mr. Olson also represented to her when he was at the home

to obtain Larry Francis1 signature that the earnest money
agreement was just a preliminary paper to tell Mr. Barker that
they were interested in his property.

(Tr. 350)

Howard and Larry Francis and Robert Barker made
several proposals and counter proposals on the earnest money
receipt.

Included in the different proposals, the shares of

water stock were increased to 180 shares.
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Additionally, Larry

and Howard were to reserve 40 acres of summer range out of the
Nine Mile ranch.

(Ex. 1)

On April 21, 1980, Howard and Larry

Francis signed the agreement with the phrase, "Agree to
above."

A closing date of May 1, 1980 was specified in the

earnest money receipt.

(Ex. 1)

Mr. Olson represented from the

beginning to the time the earnest money agreement was signed
that it was a work sheet only.

(Tr. 328, 329)

When Larry and Howard finally signed the agreement
they did not understand that it was a final agreement.
319, 380)

(Tr.

If they had understood that it was a binding

agreement, they would not have signed it.

(Tr. 323)

Neither Deanne Francis nor Anne Francis signed the
earnest money agreement.

(Ex. 1)

Deanne Francis had not

consented to having her husband sign the agreement on her
behalf.

(Tr. 296)

She never agreed to the property exchange

and she would not have signed the agreement if her husband had
brought the document to her to sign.

(Tr. 308)

In addition,

Anne Francis did not advise her husband that he could act for
her in connection with negotiations about selling the Nine Mile
Ranch.

(Tr. 350)

exchange.

She also was not in favor of the property

(Tr. 351)

The Saturday following April 21, 1980, the date the
agreement was signed by the doctors, was the first time Howard
Francis went to the Barker farm.

(Tr. 34)

later made another visit to the farm.
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Howard Francis

(Tr. 39)

The doctors

made some inquiries as to the value of the water stock.
35)

(Tr.

Based on the investigations made, Larry and Howard Francis

eventually told Mr. Olson not to go ahead with the deal.

(Tr.

36)
The earnest money agreement provided that Mr. Barker
would convey 80 acres.
approximately 150 acres.

(Ex. 1)

However, Mr. Barker's farm had

(Tr. 150)

Mr. Barker never gave Mr.

Olson a legal description to the 80 acres.

(Tr. 90)

Of the 80 acres of property Mr. Barker intended to
convey, approximately 25 or more acres lie on the east side of
the road.

(Tr. 145)

There is a deep gulley running down a

portion of the property.

(Tr. 145)

Of the total 80 acres,

there are only 30 acres of irrigated crops and 18 acres of
irrigated pasture.

(Tr. 145, 146)

There are 32 acres of brush

and waste land that produce nothing.

(Tr. 146)

The parties continued to negotiate for a period of
time.

However, the parties never reached a final agreement.

Mr. Barker brought suit seeking specific performance of the
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase or in the
alternative damages.

The case was tried before the Honorable

Boyd Bunnell on March 7 and 8, 1985.

The trial court found

that the earnest money agreement was legaly enforceable.
However, the court found that since Deanne Francis and Anne
Francis each owned an undivided one-fourth interest in the Nine
Mile ranch and because they did not sign the earnest money
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agreement nor authorize their husbands to act as their agents,
the court could not order specific performance.

(R. 173-177)

The court did find that Howard Francis and Larry
Francis breached the earnest money agreement.

However, the

court found that Plaintiff had failed to present competent
evidence of damages.

Therefore, the court awarded Plaintiff

$1.00 nominal damages and $22,126.80 attorneys fees.

(R. 229)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance as
he argues on appeal.

The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to

Purchase entered into by Plaintiff and Defendants Larry and
Howard Francis provides for an exchange of property.
Defendants Howard and Larry Francis did not agree to pay
Plaintiff $600,000 for Plaintiff's farm and water stock.
Howard and Larry Francis were interested in selling their ranch
in order to obtain cash flow.
additional property.

They did not want to obtain

The relief that Plaintiff seeks on appeal

would require this Court to rewrite the contract for the
parties and enforce an agreement which the parties did not
enter into.

A court of equity does not have the authority to

rewrite the contract of the parties.
Plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance
because of his own inequitable conduct and the inequitable
conduct of his agent.

The real estate agent handling the

transaction represented to the Defendants that the earnest
money agreement was only a work sheet and a preliminary
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agreement and not a final binding contract.

On this basis the

Defendants Larry Francis and Howard Francis signed the earnest
money agreement without having first seen the farm property or
investigated the water stock*

They anticipated that they could

still investigate the property and determine the value of the
stock.
farm.

Additionally, Plaintiff agreed to convey 80 acres of
However, a large portion of the ground was unusable

brush and waste land.
The earnest money agreement is not enforceable because
it is indefinite and there was no meeting of the minds of the
parties.

Plaintiff agreed to convey an undefined 80 acres of

property, yet he owned 150 acres in the area.

Plaintiff never

provided a legal description of the property.

Defendants were

never told which 80 acres of the 150 acres they were to
receive.

Additionally, the parties had not decided on a number

of other material matters.

The Defendants understood that the

agreement was a work sheet only and not a final agreement.
Therefore the contract is not enforceable.
The contract could not be enforced since it was not
timely closed, and there was not a tender of performance by
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial on the issue
of damages because he elected specific performance as a remedy
and the new trial is barred by res judicata.
Plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys fees since the
contract is unenforceable and Plaintiff elected specific
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performance and was therefore not entitled to nominal damages
and attorneys fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT DOES NOT HAVE AUTHORITY
TO MAKE A NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PARTIES AS
PROPOSED BY PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff, for the first time on appeal, asks this
Court for an order directing that Defendants Howard and Larry
Francis pay Plaintiff Robert Barker $600,000 in exchange for
his conveyance to them of 180 shares of Scofield Reservoir
water and 80 acres of land near Wellington, Utah.

However,

this is not the agreement that the parties entered into and
such an order would constitute the remaking of an agreement for
the parties.

This would be contrary to law and principles of

equity.
Courts are required to construe the contract made by
the parties rather than to make a contract for the parties.
East Mill Creek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 159
P.2d 863, 867 (1945).

Courts will not enforce asserted rights

that are not supported by the contract itself.

Rio Algom

Corporation v. Jimco LTD., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980).
Specific performance connotes performance specifically
as agreed.
956 (1963).

Haire v. Patterson, 63 Wash 2d 282, 386 P.2d 953,
It is not for a court to rewrite a contract or to

change the bargain on the basis of supposed equitable
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principles.

Dalton v. Jerico Construction Co., 642 P.2d 748,

750 (Utah 1982).

In Usinger v. Campbell, 280 Or. 751, 572 P.2d

1018, 1021 (1977), an action for specific performance of an
earnest money agreement, the court stated that in seeking
specific performance, plaintiffs must rely on the terms of the
earnest money agreement.

"Although the powers of an equity

court are broad, they do not permit the court to rewrite the
contract for the parties." JEc[. In D. H. Overmyer v. Brown,
439 F.2d 926, 929 (10th Cir. 1971), the Tenth Circuit in
construing Utah law stated:
Equity cannot make a new contract for the
parties, but must enforce the contract according to
its terms or not at all; the court will not make a
contract for the parties or supply any material
stipulation thereof. If a decree of specific
performance should be entered in such a case, it would
be uncertain whether the court was enforcing the
contract the parties had agreed upon, or whether it
was making a new agreement for them, and decreeing its
execution.
It is one thing to interpret a contract or discern the
contractual intent of the parties pursuant to established legal
rules, but it is another thing to make a contract for the
parties.

Courts are obligated to do the former and are

prohibited from doing the latter.

McCartney v. Malm, 627 P.2d

1014, 1020 (Wyo. 1981).
The court will not make a contract for the
parties. The contract made by them must, generally,
be enforced, if enforced at all, according to its
terms . . . In rendering a decree of specific
performance, the court has no power to decree
performance in any other manner than according to the
agreement of the parties. The court should not assume
to make a new contract for the parties and then decree
its specific performance, or undertake to compel the
-11-

defendant to do something he did not contract or agree
to do, but should enforce the contract in question
according to its terms or not at all.
Otis Oil and Gas Corporation v. Maier, 74 Wyo. 137, 284 P.2d
653, 656 (1955).
The Earnest Money and Offer to Purchase signed by the
parties in this case provides as follows:
I, Robert Barker hereby deposit with you as
earnest money the sum of $1,000 One Thousand Dollars
to secure and apply on the purchase of the property at
Howard Francis and Larry Francis Ranch in Nine Mile
Canyon . . . .
The total purchase price of $600,000 Dollars
shall be payable as follows: $1,000 which represents
the aforedescribed deposit . . . cash out by trade.
. . . The balance of $599,000.00 shall be paid as
follows: Buyer agrees to trade and seller agrees to
accept in trade as payment for the balance 173 shares
of Scofield Reservoir water and 80 acres near
Wellington, Utah, belonging to the buyer.
On the counter proposal on the earnest money, the language was
changed to 180 shares of Scofield Reservoir water.

(Ex. 1)

If this is construed to be a binding agreement, it is
an agreement to exchange property.

Larry and Howard Francis

were to trade their ranch in Nine Mile Canyon for Robert
Barker's 180 shares of Scofield Reservoir water and 80 acres of
land near Wellington, Utah.

Larry and Howard Francis have at

no time agreed to pay $600,000 to Robert Barker for his water
shares and 80 acres.
Larry and Howard Francis were desirous of selling
their ranch in order to obtain some needed cash flow.
325, testimony of Howard Francis)

They thought they could get

this cash flow by selling the water stock.
-12-

(Tr.

They did not want

to obtain additional property and the water shares and have to
give up $600,000 cash.

They were looking to liquidate the

property and obtain cash flow and not to obtain additional
property.
It would not be partial performance to require Howard
and Larry Francis to pay $600,000 for Barker's property.

It

would be rewriting the contract and making a new contract on
behalf of the parties.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF IS PRECLUDED FROM OBTAINING
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE BECAUSE OF HIS
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
There are five prerequisites before a contract can be
specifically performed.

First, there must be a contract;

second, the terms of the contract must be certain and fair;
third, there must be an absence of inequitable conduct on the
plaintiff's part; fourth, there must be an absence of hardship
to the defendant or the public outweighing the benefit to the
plaintiff from performance of the contract; and fifth, there
must be no other adequate remedy at law.
Ariz. App. 467, 528 P.2d 853, 855 (1975).

How v. Fulkerson, 22
Specific performance

is a remedy of equity, and one who invokes it must have clean
hands in having done equity himself.

Fischer v. Johnson, 525

P.2d 45, 46 (Utah 1974).
In the instant case, Roger Olson represented to the
Francises that the earnest money agreement was only a work
sheet and not a valid, binding agreement.
-13-

(Tr. 319, 328,

testimony of Howard Francis; Tr. 297, testimony of Deanrie
Francis)

On that basis only did Larry and Howard Francis sign

the earnest money agreement.

(Tr. 323, testimony of Howard

Francis; Tr. 373, testimony of Larry Francis)
The misrepresentation of the nature and character and
the legal effect of a document has been held to be actionable
fraud.

See, Berkeley Bank for Coop v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798

(Utah 1980).

Under the circumstance of this case where the

Defendants Howard and Larry Francis only signed the earnest
money agreement on the basis that they believed, as represented
by Mr. Olson, that the document was not a binding agreement and
only a work sheet, it would be inequitable for this Court to
enforce such an agreement.
Furthermore, Mr. Barker misrepresented the 80 acres he
was trading.

Howard and Larry were told that the 80 acres were

an irrigated functional farm.
Francis)

(Tr. 325, testimony of Howard

However, there is a large gulley in a portion of the

property.

(Tr. 145, testimony of Steven Hatch)

Of the total

80 acres, there are only 30 acres of irrigated crops and 18
acres of irrigated pasture.
Hatch)

(Tr. 145-146, testimony of Steven

There are 32 acres of brush and waste land that produce

nothing.

(JDd.)

It would also be inequitable to enforce the

agreement when Mr. Barker has misrepresented and omitted such
material facts.
Additionally, Defendants attempted to introduce
evidence to show that the value of the Barker farm and the
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shares in the Scofield Reservoir water were misrepresented.
However, the Court precluded this evidence on the basis that
the Defendants had failed to plead fraud in their answer with
the requisite specificity.

The Court denied Defendants' motion

to amend the answer to allege fraud in more particularity and
the Court waived the proffer of proof on the evidence of the
issue of misrepresentation of the value of the stock and the
land.

(Tr. 207-208)

The trial court erred in not allowing

evidence as to the misrepresentation since the plaintiff must
prove, as one of the requisite elements to obtain specific
performance of a contract, that he acted equitably and in good
faith.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A
NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES
Plaintiff argues in the conclusion of his brief that
in the event this Court determines that the trial court
appropriately ruled against specific performance, then
Plaintiff is entitled to monetary damages.

Plaintiff further

argues that this case should be remanded to the trial court for
a new trial on the issue of damages.

However, Plaintiff is

barred from pursuing a damage claim under the doctrines of
election of remedy and res judicata.
In the instant case, Plaintiff in his Amended
Complaint sought specific performance of the earnest money
agreement, or in the alternative, damages for its alleged
breach.

In December 1984, Defendants made a motion to require
-15-

Plaintiff to make an election of remedies.

Although

Defendants1 motion was denied, the law is clear that Plaintiff
was required to make an election.

See, Midvale Motors v.

Saunders, 19 Utah 2d 403, 432 P.2d 37 (1967).

At trial,

Plaintiff presented his case on the basis of seeking specific
performance.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that when there are
inconsistent suits in law and equity, the trial court ought to
require the Plaintiff to make an election.

In State v. Morse,

36 Utah 362, 103 Pac. 969, 970 (1909), the court stated:
If the petitioner is suing the defendant both at law
and in equity at the same time and for the same
matter, the defendant can require the petitioner to
elect whether she will proceed with the suit in equity
or with the action at law . . .
If no such election
was made, the court ought to require her to make an
election . . .
When the law gives several means for redress or relief
predicated upon conflicting theories, the election of one of
them operates as a bar against a subsequent adoption of
others.

Lindsay v. Keimig, 184 Kan. 89, 334 P.2d 326, 328

(1959); Davidson v. McKown, 157 Kan. 217, 139 P.2d 421 (1943);
Wilder v. Wilhite, 190 Kan. 564, 376 P.2d 797, 801 (1962).
Consistently, the Utah Supreme Court has held that
when there are open at the same time two coexisting remedies
which are alternative and inconsistent with each other; and,
when the plaintiff has elected one of the remedies, the other
remedy is no longer available.

Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor

Co., 69 Utah 161, 253 Pac. 196, 199 (1927).
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The purpose of the doctrine of election of remedies is
to prevent double redress for a single wrong.

Royal Resources

v, Gibralter Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979).

A

plaintiff who comes into court asserting or denying his rights
cannot assume and occupy an inconsistent position.

To this

extent the doctrine of election of remedies is founded upon
equitable principles of estoppel.

Where a litigant having an

election as to remedial rights which are inconsistent sees fit
to adopt one, he excludes the other and is thereafter estopped
to rely on it for either affirmative or defensive purposes.
Davidson, supra at 426.
In Ladd v. General Insurance Company, 236 Or. 260, 387
P.2d 572 (1963) the court held that the doctrine of election of
remedies has some similarities with the doctrine of res
judicata.

The court stated:

Election of remedies ordinarily characterizes the
situation in which a plaintiff who has two or more
available avenues to the same general relief pursues
one to judgment . . . He may thereafter be precluded
from pursuing the others . . . When enforced, the
rule forbids subsequent litigation, either to enhance
a meager victory won in the first effort or to
rehabilitate a defeat suffered there. (Emphasis added)
!£.

at 574-75.
The Utah Supreme Court has outlined the factual

situation where the election of remedy doctrine applies:
The true rule seems to be (1) that there must be, in
fact, two or more coexisting remedies upon which the
party has the right to elect; (2) the remedies thus
open to him must be alternative and inconsistent; and
(3) he must by actually bringing an action or by some
other decisive act, with knowledge of the facts,
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indicate his choice between these inconsistent
remedies.
Cook, supra, at 199,
Plaintiff elected the remedy of specific performance
by pursuing that claim at the trial and, therefore, the remedy
of damages is barred.

Plaintiff is not entitled to another

trial on the issue of damages.
Additionally, at trial Plaintiff did make a damage
claim based on expert opinion.

Plaintiff presented expert

testimony as to the reasonable rental value of Plaintiff's
property and relied on the Sprouse Lease on the Nine Mile
property as evidence of damages for breach of contract (see
Testimony of Steven Hatch, real estate appraiser, Tr.
138-146).

The court correctly rejected this evidence since it

was incompetent evidence of the difference in the value of
Plaintiff's and Defendants' property.
The law refuses to tolerate a multiplicity of or
needless litigation.

This is based on the worthy premise that

the interest of the proper administration of justice is best
served by limiting parties to one fair trial of an issue or
cause.

46 Am Jur 2d Judgments §395 (1969).
A judgment is conclusive not only as to matters

actually determined at trial, but also to other matters which
could properly have been raised and determined therein.

46

Am Jur 2d Judgments §420 (1969).
It should also be noted that the Court did not limit
Plaintiff in the presentation of his case so that he cannot now
-18-

claim that there was no reasonable opportunity to present
evidence on the damage issue as he now, in the alternative,
seeks to do.

Plaintiff not only had the opportunity to but did

put on evidence of damage.

Therefore, in the interest of

preventing multiplicity of suits, Plaintiff is barred from
relitigating that issue.
POINT IV
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS OF THE PARTIES
AND THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO
PURCHASE IS NOT LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE SINCE
IT FAILS FOR LACK OF DEFINITENESS
In order to have a binding contract, the minds of the
parties must have arrived at a sufficient definite understanding as to the terms so that the parties know what they are
bound to do and what they are to receive.

Efco Distributing v.

Perin, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615, 161 (1966).

A

binding contract can exist only where there has been mutual
assent by the parties manifesting their intenion to be bound by
its terms.

Furthermore, a contract can be enforced by the

courts only if the obligations of the parties are set forth
with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed.

Bunnell

v. Bulls, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (1962).
Additionally, a writing must contain all the essential
terms in a contract for the sale of land in order to satisfy
the requirements of the statute of frauds.

The memorandum

required by the statute of frauds presupposes a prior valid
agreement and the meeting of the minds of the parties.
Am Jur 2d Statute of Frauds §290 (1974).
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The memorandum must

show a completed contract, and if the parties have left an
essential part of the agreement for future determination, it
shows merely an incomplete contract.

Id.

In the case of a contract to sell land, the memorandum
must describe the land sold.
§322 (1974).

72 Am Jur 2d Statute of Frauds

The property must be described or designated with

reasonable certainty.

The test is whether the writing furnishes

the means of identification.

72 Am Jur 2d Statute of Frauds

§323 (1974).
The writing must contain something to designate
or describe a particular piece of land. In view of
that requirement, it is plain that if the premises
bargained for are a part of a larger tract owned by
the vendor, the question whether or not the writing
satisfies the statute as to description will depend
upon whether within itself or by references made it
does or it does not in practical effect describe or
designate the part covered by the contract.

Additionally, a court cannot grant a decree of
specific performance "unless all terms of the agreement are
clear.

The court cannot compel the performance of a contract

which the parties did not mutually agree upon."

Pitcher v.

Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491, 493 (1967).
The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness,
and ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to conjecture or
to be supplied by the court. It must be sufficiently
certain and definite in its terms to leave no
reasonable doubt as to what the parties intended, and
no reasonable doubt of the specific thing equity is
called upon to have performed, and it must be
sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the court
may enforce it as actually made by the parties.
Id.

-20-

In addition, if an insufficient description is given
in a contract to sell land, oral evidence is not admissible
because a court will never receive such evidence both to
describe the land and then to apply the description.

72 Am Jur

2d §322 (1974).
Parol evidence is admissible to apply, not to
supply, a description of lands in a contract. Parol
evidence will not be admitted to complete a defective
description, or to show the intention with which it
was made. Parol evidence may be used for the purpose
of identifying the description contained in the
writing with its location upon the ground, but not for
the purpose of ascertaining and locating the land
about which the parties negotiated, and supplying a
description thereof which they have omitted from the
writing. There is a clear distinction between the
admission of oral and extrinsic evidence for the
purpose of identifying the land described and applying
the description to the property and that of supplying
and adding to a description insufficient and void on
its fact.
Davis v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1973).
In Pitcher, supra, the parties entered into an earnest
money receipt and offer to purchase which provided:
The total purchase price of $100,000.00 shall be
payable as follows: $100.00 which represents the
aforedescribed deposit, receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged by you: on delivery of deed or final
contract of sale which shall be on or before May 1,
1962, and balance of purchase price to be paid as
follows: 30 acres in North Logan as indicated by map
valued at $50,000.00, $25,000.00 from loan on seller's
farm and seller to carry balance on contract or second
mortgage at 5% interest. (Emphasis added)
The defendant owned a total of 189 acres of land in
North Logan.

The court held that the earnest money receipt and

offer to purchase was not enforceable since it lacked
certainty.

"[I]t was not certain which 30 acres of the 189
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acres owned by the defendant were to be conveyed to plaintff."
J[d. at 493.
In Davis, supra, the plaintiff brought suit to
specifically enforce a real estate contract wherein the seller
was to convey some property "less any acreage reserved by
seller."

The court found that since the seller could reserve

any portion of the property as he so determined it was
impossible to define the exact portion of the acreage which
would be sold to the buyer; therefore, the description was not
sufficient to permit specific performance.

The court stated:

In the instant action, the agreement in clear and
unambiguous terms provided that the location and
description of the land to be conveyed was subject to
the future mutual agreement of the parties. This
writing constituted a mere expression of a purpose to
make a contract in the future, for the whole matter
was contingent on further negotiations.
JEd. at 1028.
In the present case, Mr. Roger Olson, the real estate
agent handling the transaction, discussed with Howard and Larry
Francis before they signed the earnest money receipt that the
document was only a work sheet and not a binding agreement.
(Tr. 313, 319, 328, testimony of Howard Francis; Tr. 373,
testimony of Larry Francis)

Additionally, Mr. Olson told

Deanne Tanner Francis, Howard Francis1 wife, and Anne Francis,
Larry Francis1 wife, that the earnest money was not a binding
agreement and was just a preliminary paper.

(Tr. 298,

testimony of Deanne Francis; Tr. 350, testimony of Anne
Francis)

Based on their understanding that they were not bound
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by the earnest money receipt, Howard and Larry Francis finally
signed the document on April 21, 1980 without having seen the
Barker ranch.

(Tr. 34, testimony of Howard Francis)

The first

time Howard Francis saw the farm was the Saturday following
April 21, 1980.

(Tr. 34, testimony of Howard Francis)

At

trial Roger Olson admitted that he told Howard and Larry that
there were other things that would have to be agreed upon
before the final agreement.
Olson)

(Tr. 98, testimony of Roger

Howard and Larry would not have signed the earnest

money agreement if they had understood that it was a binding
agreement.

(Tr. 323, testimony of Howard Francis)

Howard and

Larry did not understand the earnest money agreement to be a
final binding agreement.
Howard and Larry had not seen Mr. Barker's farm before
they signed the agreement.

They had not made an inquiry as to

the value of the water stock.

Everything Howard and Larry knew

about the property came from Roger Olson who had received the
information from Mr. Barker.

(Tr. 30, testimony of Howard

Francis)
Deanne Francis and Anne Francis, the wives
respectively of Howard Francis and Larry Francis and joint
owners of the Nine Mile Ranch, had not been consulted regarding
the transaction.

They had not agreed to the sale.

(Tr. 308,

testimony of Deanne Francis; Tr. 351, testimony of Anne Francis)
The earnest money agreement does not contain the
description of either the Nine Mile Ranch or the Barker farm
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property*

Mr. Barker agreed to convey 80 acres of property

near Wellington (Ex. 1 ) . However, he owned a total of 150
acres all together.
Barker)

(Tr. 152, 170, testimony of Robert

Roger Olson was never given a legal description of the

80 acres.

(Tr. 90, testimony of Roger Olson)

Mr. Barker has

never given the Francises a legal description of the 80 acres.
(Tr. 194, 199, testimony of Robert Barker)
The parties had not discussed or agreed upon which of
the 40 acres of the summer range would be retained by the
Francises.

(Tr. 93, 95, 99, testimony of Roger Olson; Tr. 192,

testimony of Robert Barker)

Furthermore, there was no

discussion or agreement where the right-of-way to the 40 acres
would be located and the width of the right-of-way.

(J^d)

At the time of the transaction, Mr. Barker did not own
the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the farm property.

(Tr.

191, testimony of Robert Barker; Tr. 271, testimony of Dan
Keller)

The Barker farm was subject to two different mineral

leases.

(Tr. 236, testimony of Therald Jensen; Tr. 272,

testimony of Dan Keller)
mineral lease removed.

Mr. Barker never did seek to get the
(Tr. 214, testimony of Robert Barker)

It was never agreed whether the Francises would take the farm
property subject to the leases.
It was never decided whether there were water rights
that went with the 80 acres of land independent of the shares
of the Scofield water.

(Tr. 325, testimony of Howard Francis)
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The Francises1 property was subject to an underlying
contract.

(Tr. 262, testimony of Dan Keller)

The parties had

not agreed who would pay off the contract on the property.
(Tr. 110, testimony of Roger Olson)
After signing the earnest money agreement, the parties
continued to negotiate various items regarding the agreement.
There were discussions regarding hunting privileges on the Nine
Mile Ranch.

(Ex. 42; Tr. 250, testimony of Therald Jensen)

There were also discussions regarding a lease on the farm
property.

(Id.)
In summary, as Howard Francis testified, there were

many things yet to be done and a need for further negotiations
before a final agreement could be made:
There were several things that I understood would have
to be done. Number one, I understood that our wives
would have to be aware of this document and would have
to give their consent and agreement and would have to
sign a document in order for it to be binding. I felt
that we had progressed far enough in our negotiations
to the point that we now had something with which to
discuss in person with Mr. Barker; and at this point I
now suggested to Mr. Olson that we go down to
Wellington and meet Mr. Barker, that we see what the
farm as had been represented to me, was, where it was,
what it consisted of, what it looked like, and so on,
whether it had ditches, what type they were, whether
it had water appurtenant to it, how it was irrigated,
what went with it, and so on. I also felt that at
this point we should now investigate and determine
whether the water shares were as represented by Mr.
Barker through his agent, Mr. Olson. I also knew that
we had to determine where the 40 acres would be on the
summer range of our property that we would be
retaining and communicate that information to the
Barkers. I knew that we would have to delineate and
define the right-of-way to help us get to that 40
acres. That hadn't been determined. I didn't have
any knowledge about the mineral rights on Mr. Barker's
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80 acres, what they were, whether they had any value
or not.
(Tr. 324, testimony of Howard Francis)
The Francises were told by the real estate agent
handling the transaction that the Earnest Money was not a
binding agreement.

On that basis, they signed the agreement

without seeing the property and investigating the value of the
water shares, and with the understanding it was only
preliminary and not final and was subject to further
negotiation.

Also, they did not involve their wives in the

negotiations as they normally would do.

Therefore, the wives

who were joint owners of the ranch had never agreed to the
property exchange.

There remained many items still to be

determined by the parties.

The parties had not arrived at a

sufficient definite understanding as to the terms of the
agreement.

The earnest money agreement is void for lack of

definiteness, and it is unenforceable since it does not comply
with the requrements of the statute of frauds.
POINT V
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE
IS VOID SINCE THE PARTIES DID NOT TIMELY
CLOSE THE TRANSACTION
One condition to the acceptance of the Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase was a stipulation that the
closing date would be May 1, 1980 (Exhibit 1).

The parties did

not close nor did the Plaintiff offer tender of performance
before that date.
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A tender of performance should be seasonable, and
should be made at the time fixed by the contract for
performance.

17A C.J.S. Contracts §482 (1963).

While time may

be made of the essence of the contract by express stipulation,
this result may occur from implication as well as express
provision.

Time of the essence of the contract may appear

either from the language of the contract, clearly indicating,
although not expressly stating, such intention, or from the
circumstances surrounding the transaction such as the relation
of the parties.

91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser §104 (1955).

Ordinarily, therefore, the question is one of intention and to
be ascertained from the construction of the contract as a whole
and with reference to the circumstances surrounding the
transaction.
In the instant case, Plaintiff first scheduled
April 1, 1980 as the closing date in his initial offer to
purchase.

The Defendants extended the closing date to May 1,

1980 as the condition for the acceptance of the offer.

The

transaction included the transfer of both a ranch and a farm.
It was apparently essential for Plaintiff to receive the
property he was to get and in turn both parties would need to
know who was going to be operating the farm early in order that
planting and other spring activities could occur.

The specific

inclusion of the term in the contract shows that time was of
the essence to the parties.

Additionally, the Defendants

conducted themselves as though the April 21 closing date was of
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the essence.

When the Francises received a letter dated May

27, 1980 from Therald Jensen, Mr. Barker's attorney, in which
Mr. Jensen proposed a closing date of June 10, 1980, the
Francises refused on the basis that the closing time had
already gone by and that there was no agreement.

(Tr. 202,

testimony of Robert L. Barker; Tr. 336, testimony of Howard
Francis)
Where time is of the essence, both parties are
discharged from their contract obligations under an earnest
money receipt if neither makes tender of performance by the
agreed closing date.

Century 21 All Western Real Estate and

Investment, Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 55 n.l (Utah, 1982).

In

Guillory Corporation v. Dussin Investment Company, 272 Or. 267,
536 P.2d 501, 505 (1975), the court stated:
This is an action for damages, in which plaintiff
must necessarily affirm the existence and enforceability of the earnest money agreement as the basis
for its claim for damages. The earnest money agreement, by its express terms, was to expire on June 30,
1971, the date provided for the closing of the
transaction, with "time of the essence," unless on or
before that date the seller tendered a contract to
convey good title and the buyer tendered the down
payment. On June 30th neither party performed and
although neither refused to perform, neither party at
that time either demanded performance by the other or
claimed any excuse for its own failure to perform . .
Under these facts, we hold that the earnest money
agreement expires by its own terms on June 30, 1971.
Even if time is not of the essence of performance
under the earnest money agreement, performance must occur
within a reasonable time.

See, Duprey v. Donahoe, 52 Wash. 2d

129, 323 P.2d 903 (1958); Bursack v. Moore, 165 Colo. 414, 439
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P.2d 993 (1968); and Schull v. Sexton, 154 Colo. 311, 390 P.2d
313 (1964).

91 C.J.C. Vendor1 & Purchaser §101 (1955) provides:

If the contract of sale does not specify the time
of performance, or the terms as to time are indefinite
. . . a reasonable time for performance will
ordinarily be implied. In other words a reasonable
time for performance will be allowed, and performance
within a reasonable time will be required. What is a
reasonable time necessarily depends on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case.
The rule requiring performance within a reasonable time applies
both to the time for making and executing the conveyance by the
vendor, and to the time for making a tendering payment by the
purchaser.

Id.

In the instant case, both the specific time and a
reasonable time for performance had passed.
not willing to close at a later date.

The Francises were

Mr. Barker never

tendered performance under the earnest money agreement.
Therefore, the earnest money agreement is void since there was
not a timely tender of performance by either party.
POINT VI
PLAINTIFF CANNOT SUE FOR BREACH OF THE EARNEST
MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE SINCE HE
FAILED TO TENDER PERFORMANCE UNDER THE CONTRACT
Where either party to a contract seeks to enforce it
by suit, he must first put the other party in default by making
and tendering performance under the contract.
Hayes, 560 P.2d 1124 (Utah, 1977).

See, Huch v.

In Century 21 All Western

Real Estate and Investment, Inc. v. Webb, supra, the court
stated:
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During the executory period of a contract whose
time of performance is uncertain but which contemplates ,simultaneous performance by both parties, such
as the earnest money agreement involved in this case,
neither party can be said to be in default (and thus
susceptible to a judgment for damages or a decree for
specific performance) until the other party has
tendered his own performance . . . . In other words,
the party who desires to use legal process to exercise
his legal remedies under such a contract must make a
tender of his own agreed performance in order to put
the other party in default.
Id. at 55-56.
Furthermore, in a case of specific performance, the
tender of performance by the plaintiff is required in order to
fulfill the equitable clean-hands requirement.
[I]t is also true that specific performance is remedy
of equity; and one who invokes it must have clean
hands in having done equity himself. That is, he must
take care to discharge his own duties under the
contract . . . [H]e must make an effort to perform, or
to tender performance, which manifests reasonable
diligence and a bona fide desire to keep his own
promises.
Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45, 46-47 (Utah 1974).
In Fischer, supra, the plaintiff and defendant entered
into an earnest money agreement in anticipation of entering
into a contract for purchase of the defendant's restaurant.
The earnest money agreement required plaintiff to pay $3,000
when the seller approved the sale and that approval of and
entry into the final contract must be done by March 19, 1973.
On March 19, 1973, plaintiff delivered to an employee of
defendant a notice stating that he was ready and willing to
enter into and perform the purchase contract.
plaintiff did not tender the $3,000.
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However, the

The court held that the

notice was insufficient, and the plaintiff was required to
tender the $3,000.

The Utah Supreme Court therefore reversed

the judgment for specific performance.
In the instant case, Mr. Barker failed to tender the
deed to the 80 acres and the water stock.

In fact, it was

impossible for Mr. Barker to do so since he did not own all the
mineral rights on his farm and the property was subject to
mineral leases.

(Tr. 271, 272, testimony of Dan Keller) Mr.

Barker did nothing to get the mineral leases removed.
214, testimony of Robert Barker)

(Tr.

Therefore, Plaintiff is not

entitled to enforcement of the earnest money agreement.
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY AWARDED
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS FEES
Since Plaintiff elected to sue in equity for specific
performance, as argued above, he was precluded by the doctrine
of election of remedies from bringing an action at law for
damages.

Therefore, Plaintiff was not entitled to even a

nominal damage award.

Additionally, Plaintiff was not entitled

to the attorneys fees award on the action at law for alleged
breach of contract since the action at law was precluded by the
election to pursue the equitable remedy.
Furthermore, as argued above, the trial court
erroneously found that Defendants Larry and Howard Francis had
breached the earnest money agreement.

The earnest money

agreement is not enforceable because the contract is indefinite
and there is no meeting of the minds of the parties.
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Additionally, the earnest money agreement was not timely
closed, and Plaintiff failed to tender performance under the
contract.

Since the earnest money agreement is not

enforceable, Defendants are not liable for even nominal damages
for breach of contract.

In addition, Plaintiff is not entitled

to attorneys fees on the nominal damage award given for breach
of contract.
Furthermore, Plaintiff's affidavit in support of
attorneys fees is insufficient in that it does not detail when
the alleged services were performed, the nature of the services
rendered, and the reasonable value thereof, or the basis for
the hourly rate charge.

Since the evidence of attorneys fees

is insufficient, the attorneys fee award was erroneous.
Additionally, there is no way to distinguish the work done on
the specific performance aspect of the case and the damage
aspect of the case (a copy of the affidavit in support of
attorneys fees is included in the Addendum).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff does not seek partial specific performance,
but is attempting to have this Court make a new agreement for
the parties and then enforce it.

Additionally, Plaintiff is

not entitled to specific performance because of the inequitable
conduct of Plaintiff and his agent.

The earnest money

agreement is not enforceable since it is indefinite and there
was no meeting of minds by the parties.

Additionally, the

earnest money agreement was not timely closed and Plaintiff
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failed to tender performance under the agreement.

Plaintiff is

not entitled to attorneys fees since he elected to sue for
specific performance and the contract is not enforceable and
therefore there are no grounds for a finding of breach of
contract.

Defendants ask this court to uphold the judgment of

the trial court, denying specific performance of the earnest
money agreement to Plaintiff.

Additionally, Defendants ask

that the judgment of attorneys fees and costs awarded to
Plaintiff be reversed.
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FRED D. HOWARD, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 EMt 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84608
Telephone: (801) 373-6345

Our File No. 14,342

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT L. BARKER,

:

Plaintiff,

:

AFFIDAVIT FOR
ATTORNEY FEES

vs.
DR. HOWARD R. FRANCIS,
DEANNE TANNER FRANCIS,
DR. LARRY FRANCIS and
ANN BANKS FRANCIS,

Civil No. 13,901
:
:

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
* ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH )
I, Fred D. Howard, upon my oath, do hereby state:
I have examined the accounting records and ledgers of this law office, which
has represented the plaintiffs

in the above-entitled action, and I have been a

primary attorney involved and responsible for prosecution of the plaintiff's case.
Attorney's fees have been accumulated in this case by the labors and services of
various attorneys and clerks associated with the law firm of Howard, Lewis &
Petersen since initiation of the lawsuit.

Charges have varied from time to time

with general rate increases over past years and have accumulated with the following
individuals, time and rates:
NAME

HOURLY RATE

Jackson Howard
Jackson Howard
Fred D. Howard
Leslie W. Slaugh
Leslie W. Slaugh
Danielle Davis
John L. Valentine
Clerks

$100.00
$150.00
$ 50.00
$ 30.00
$ 50.00
$ 45.00
$ 75.00
$ 20.00

HRS.

TOTAL

6.00
69.00
83.75
1.75
7.00
12.50
.25
94.15

$ 600.00
$10,350.00
$ 4,187.00
$ 52.50
$ 350.00
$ 562.50
$ 18.75
$ 1,883.00
$18,004.25

The hourly rates accrued herein are typical as of market rates for legal
services at the particular time and have been reasonable in nature, if not conservative.

The award of

the sum of $18,004.25 for attorney

fees is, therefore, a

reasonable, proper and accurate attorney fees.
In addition

to the

preceding, plaintiffs

have

accrued

costs relative to

prosecution of the suit in the sum of $1,901.04, all of which costs have been
necessary and related to the regular prosecution of plaintiff's claims.

An itemiza-

tion of said costs is attached herewith and labeled and Exhibit "A".
DATED this J ^ ^ t l a v of March, 1985.

:

^SW

RED D. HOWARD, for:
HOWARD, L£WIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

2

«ctf
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this

day of March, 1985.

NOTARY PUBLIQ

My Commission Expires:

Residing at

^-yvu^iM^. k&J
MAILED a copy of the foregoing Affidavit

for Attorney's Fees, postage

prepaid, thisC7j_ day of March, 1985 to:
Arthur H. Nielsen
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Richard M Taylor
TAYLOR & TAYLOR
275 North Main Street
Spanish Fork, UT 84660

'•TfO-

SECRETARY
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